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RESEARCH OBJECTIVES
The ultimate objective of our research is to gain a better understanding of man' s
mental capacities by studying the ways in which these capacities manifest themselves
in language. Language is a particularly promising avenue because, on the one hand,
it is an intellectual achievement that is accessible to all normal humans and, on the
other hand, we have more detailed knowledge about language than about any other
human activity involving man's mental capacities.
In studying language it has long been traditional to deal with certain topics such
as pronunciation, inflection of words, word formation, the expression of syntactic
relations, word order, and so forth. Moreover, the manner in which these topics
are treated has also been quite standard for a very long time. This format has
on the whole proved to be quite effective for the characterization of all languages,
although quite a few shortcomings have been noticed and discussed at length. It would
seem plausible that the main reason for the success of the traditional format is that
it was adequate to the task, and to this extent the traditional framework embodies
true insights about the nature of language. Much of the effort of our group con-
tinues to be devoted to the further extension of the theoretical framework of linguis-
tics and to the validation of particular aspects of the framework. As our work progresses
it becomes ever clearer that a single framework must indeed underlie all human lan-
guages for when really understood the differences among even the most widely separate
languages are relatively minor.
The preceding discussion leads quite naturally to the question, "What evidence from
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outside of linguistics might one adduce in favor of the hypothesis that all languages are
constructed in accordance with a single plan, a single framework?" It seems to us that
the most striking evidence in favor of the hypothesis is, on the one hand, the rapidity
with which children master their mother tongue, and on the other hand, the fact that
even a young child's command of his mother tongue encompasses not only phrases and
utterances he has heard but also an unlimited number of phrases and utterances he has
not previously encountered. To account for these two sets of facts, we must assume
that in learning a language a child makes correct inferences about the structural
principles that govern his language on the basis of very limited exposure to the actual
sentences and utterances. In other words, we must assume that with regard to matters
of language a child is uniquely capable of jumping to the correct conclusions in the over-
whelming majority of instances, and it is the task of the student of language to explain
how this might be possible.
A possible explanation might run as follows. Assume that the human organism is
constructed so that man is capable of discovering only selected facts about language and,
moreover, that he is constrained to represent his discoveries in a very specific fashion
from which certain fairly far-reaching inferences about the organization of other
parts of the language would follow automatically. If this assumption is accepted,
the next task is to advance specific proposals concerning the devices that might be
actually at play. The obvious candidate is the theoretical framework of linguistics,
for while it is logically conceivable that the structure of language might be quite
distinct from that of the organism that is known to possess the ability to speak,
it is much more plausible that this is not the case, that the structures that appear
to underlie all languages reflect quite directly features of the human mind. To the
extent that this hypothesis is correct - and there is considerable empirical evidence
in its favor -the study of language is rightly regarded as an effort at mapping the
mysteries of the human mind.
M. Halle
A. ON THE FORMALIZATION OF INFINITE SETS OF
PHONOLOGICAL RULES
In this report we describe a formalism for rules of the type: "Do something to every
th
n vowel, " where n can be any integer. Rules of this type are fairly common
(essentially with n= 2): vowel syncope in Indo-European (Borgstroml), vowel dropping
in Old Irish (Thurneysen2), stress-assignment in Southern Paiute (Sapir3), reducing
of unstressed vowels in modern Kalmyk, a dialect of Mongolian, schwa-dropping in
French, and so forth. Chomsky and Halle 4 proposed using the schema (X)* to represent
such rules. This supplementary device is not actually needed; a judicious use of con-
ventions already available (specifically, variables over sequences of segments and
parentheses) enables accounting for the same range of phenomena. The essential idea
behind the present proposal comes from Halle who mentioned once that he had the
intuition that such processes are the result of a combination of conjunctive and disjunc-
tive ordering;5 thus, disjunctive ordering would be responsible for skipping certain
vowels. Given this basic idea, it is a rather straightforward task to work out the cor-
responding formalism. In this report, C stands for [-syll], V for [+syll], V for +syll .
Consider first the schema +long]
(1) A - B / - (T)U
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where A, B, T, U are phonological matrices. The application of (1) to a given form is
governed by the following conventions
(2) (a) (1) abbreviates the set of two rules
(la) A-- B
(lb) A --- B
-TU
U.
(b) If either of the two rules (la), (lb) is applied, the other cannot be applied
(unless we deal with two nonintersecting domains of application or with two
different cycles).
(c) Given a form to which neither (la) nor (ib) has yet applied, if the structural
condition for (la) is met, then it must apply; in other words, (la) is ordered
before (ib).
Consider such a rule as
(3) V .... - ( C0 V )x#o
where X is a variable ranging over sequences of syllables. Rule (3) stands for the
infinite set of schemas S:
- ( C o V ) C Vn # n = 0, 1, 2, . . .0O 0
Given the form
(5) # C VC VC VC VC VC VC V # (7 syllables),
there are 7 values of X which are relevant:
-- ( C V ) C V6O O
(ii) V --- . / -- ( CV ) CV 5 #
o O
(vi) V---... / - ( CV ) CV #
(vii) V -- ... / - ( CV ) #
The seven schemas in (6) are "applied" simultaneously. Consider (7), where the
schemas in (6) have been expanded into their component parts:
(7) (i) (a)
(b)
v--- . . . / - C v7#
o___
V -
(b) V- ....
/ ~ C V6#
/ C v6#
/ -CV 5#
o
QPR No. 104
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251
(XX. LINGUISTICS)
(iii) (a) V ... / C V5#o
(b) V- ..
(iv) (a) V -- ..
/ C V4#
/ -c v4#
O
(b) V - ... / - C V 3 #O
(v) (a) V --- ... /
(b) V
(vi) (a) V
(b) V--
(vii) (a) V
(b) V --
-C V3#0
-C V 2#
0
-C V2 #
o
____ 2cv
./ - CV #
o
.. V. / CV#0
Let us suppose that schema (i) "applies" to (5). As (ia) cannot apply, (ib) applies. But
(ib) = (iia); hence, by convention (2b), (iib) cannot apply because (iiia) = (iib), (iiia) does
not apply; then, (iiib) applies. Along the same lines, as (iva) = (iiib), by convention(2b),
(ivb) cannot apply, i. e., (va) cannot apply; i. e., (vb) applies, etc. To sum up, the
set
C V6#
o___
V -- . . . / - C V 4 #
o
V - 2 / #
will apply to (5), yielding
(9) # C ... C VC ... C VC ... VC . #.
Similarly, if we suppose that (i) does not "apply, " we shall get
(10) # CVC... CVC... CVC... CV #.
In other terms, the string "- ( C V ) X #" in (3) formalizes the notion of "every
other vowel. " This formalism can be generalized. Thus a rule applying to every third7
vowel has the form
QPR No. 104
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(11) V -- ... / - ( C V ( C V ) ) X #.
We see that we are left with an indeterminacy; that is, there are two complementary
sets of rules which can apply to a form such as (5) to yield either (9) or (10). We do not
have a convention such as (2c) which would enable us to choose between the two sets.
An example of how this problem can be solved is to assume that every other vowel of
a word receives primary stress, beginning with the first one. We write the rule
(12) V--- [1 stress] / #YC - ( C V )X#
o o0
and posit the following convention.
(13) In a schema making use of variables ranging over sequences of syllables, the
rules of the expansion of the schema corresponding to the value "0" of the variables
must be applied when a form meets the structural condition of those rules.
This is a very natural convention: It simply means that the variables are used to
their full "potential"; in (12), for instance, if the rule corresponding to Y = 0 were not
applied to the word, we could replace the schema by
(14) V -- [1 stress] / #C VYC ---- ( CoV )X#.
Along those lines, the rule for Stress Assignment in Southern Paiute is
(15) V - [1 stress] / #(CoVY)C ---- ((COV) X)CoV #.
In Tiibatiilabal, a rule lengthens every other vowel following a long vowel; the rule does
not apply to vowels adjacent to long vowels. 9 ' 10 We will represent this phenomenon by
(16) (i) V--V / VC VYCo (C V)X(C oVZ)
(ii) V --- V / -- C V
We simply need to state the following (very natural) convention:
(17) Let V - ... / ... AX.... ... YB... be a subset of a set of schemas S
(where X and Y are variables over sequences of syllables, and A and B are phonologi-
cally specified syllables). Then S applies to any domain such that X f TAU, Y f
WBZ.
ADDENDUM
In a recent report, "On Algorithms for Applying Phonological Rules," 
1 1 S. R.
Anderson proposed the following algorithm.
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(1) Revised Simultaneous Application Convention (RSAC):
Scan the string for segments that satisfy the constraints of the rule. When such a
segment is found, identify it, and associate with that identification an identification of
the environmental analysis that makes the rule applicable to that segment. If any
environment contains a segment marked as undergoing the rule (other than the one with
whose applicability this environment is associated), mark that as a violation. Then erase
the minimal number of applicability identifications and their associated environment
specifications that will eliminate all of the violations. Apply the rule simultaneously
to the segments remaining marked as undergoing the rule.
(2) Principle 2: When, in applying RSAC, two or more possibilities exist for elim-
inating the violations in an analysis of a form with respect to a rule, and each is mini-
mal, in that it eliminates the smallest possible number of applications of the rule
within the form, and the rule is an iterative one, choose that elimination set which
allows the rule to reapply over one that does not allow reapplication.
Anderson offers as an example a rule of tone loss in Acoma:
(3) V - [-high tone] [+obst] [-long[+obst] C Vhigtone
He assumes that this rule is iterative. Consider in this light the underlying form
sipekaawan/ ($ stands for V ; the other tone features are left unmarked).
+high tone? /
On a first pass the rule yields /sipekaawani/, in accordance with RSAC and Principle 2.
On the second pass, the rule lowers the tone on /e/. The output is sipekaawanl 'when
I chopped wood'. Consider now the underlying form /s citfstaian/ where three con-
secutive syllables satisfy the conditions for tone loss. The surface form is sucltistaani
'when I was thinking' as predicted by RSAC; Principle 2 does not come into play and
there is only one pass.
Anderson's algorithm predicts that we would obtain "pisicititaaw" from the hypo-
thetical underlying form /pisicititaawf/ where four consecutive syllables satisfy the
conditions for tone loss. Whether such behavior can be observed in the language is an
empirical issue. We want to point out that the evidence for iterative rules is very slim
(not to mention that such rules constitute an incredibly powerful device l2). Moreover,
in the case of /sucitistaani/, RSAC and the principle underlying Principle 2 (rules
apply to maximize their utilization in the grammar unless they are explicitly prevented
from doing so) are actually in conflict: If rule (3) were to apply to /sUcitistaan/ in
accordance with the maximization principle, it should reapply twice to yield
*:sucitistaan. Under these circumstances, Principle 2 appears to be totally ad hoc.
We note that in the case of sucitist/ani RSAC produces an alternation of the type
that we have been considering in this report. It is easy to see, however, that such a
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principle cannot take the place of the formalism that we have been proposing. Consider,
for example, a language in which words are assigned stress on every even-numbered
vowel. If we state the rule as:
(4) V --- a [1 stress] / C VCO O--
the string
(5) #C VC VC VC VC VC VC V#
O O O O O O O
(7 syllables)
will be analyzed by RSAC either as
(6) #C VC V C VC V C VC V C V#00 00 00 o
or
(7) #C V C VC V C VC V C VC V#
I I I I I
If we write the rule as
(8) V -- [1 stress] (#) c veO O--
to insure that the second vowel in the word is stressed, we still have two alternatives:
(9) #C VC V C VC V C VC V C V#
L j I I I
(10) #C VC V C V C VC V C VC V#
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
In this case (as in the case of any word with an odd number of syllables) Principle 2
is of no help, and Anderson's algorithm incorrectly yields two outputs.
J. R. Vergnaud
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6. We assume that substrings enclosed in parentheses are expanded later than vari-
ables lying outside the parentheses. As far as (3) is concerned the other alternative
(variables first, parentheses second) would be meaningless. A recent proposal by
Halle (Ling. Inquiry 2, 540 (1971)), suggests that this ordering convention is
more general; variables should be expanded first, wherever they show up. Halle
points out that a rule which treats a given segment A on a par with the boundary
of the word can be formalized as
B --- C /# (XA) - Y #
or B - C /# Y -- (AX) #
where X and Y are variables. If the parentheses were to be expanded first, con-
vention (2b) would forbid the rule to apply at the same time within the word and at
the extremity, which is empirically wrong, as J. W. Harris has pointed out to
Halle.
7. We are describing "propagations" from left to right. To describe "propagations"
from right to left, (3) and (11) will have to be replaced by (a) and (b), respectively:
(a) V --... /# X ( C V )-
o
(b) V--... # X ( ( C V ) CV )-----
o o
8. N. Chomsky and M. Halle, op. cit., p. 347.
9. T. M. Lightner, "On Swadesh and Voegelin's 'A problem in phonological alterna-
tion'" (unpublished paper, 1971).
10. J. D. McCawley, "Length and Voicing in Tiibatiilabal," Papers from the Fifth
Regional Meeting of the Chicago Linguistic Society, 1969, pp. 407-415.
11. S. R. Anderson, Quarterly Progress Report No. 103, Research Laboratory of Elec-
tronics, M.I.T., October 15, 1971, pp. 159-164.
12. J. R. Vergnaud, "Some Phonological Problems in French, Tilbatilabal and Turkish"
(unpublished paper, M.I.T., 1971).
B. A TRANSFORMATIONAL RULE IN RUSSIAN PHONOLOGY
Modern Russian exhibits an alternation of phonetic [ov] with [u] in the present tense
of some first conjugation a-stem verbs:
(1) klevat, 'to peck': kljuju (1 sg.), kljuet (3 sg.), kljujut (3 pl.)
torgovat, 'to trade': torguju (1 sg.), torguet (3 sg.), torgujut (3 pl.)
celovat, 'to kiss': celuju (1 sg.), celuet (3 sg.), celujut (3 pl.)
I know of two attempts to account for this alternation within the framework of generative
1phonology. Lightner suggests that both alternants are derived from the underlying
diphthongs ou/ and /eu/, where /U/ is to be identified with the so-called back yer.
For example, ignoring irrelevant details, the phonological representation for celovat,
is, under this analysis, /cel+ou+ai+t,/. There is a rule which converts / into /w/
when followed by a vowel, and a later rule which converts /w/ into /v/, giving us the
correct form. In the present tense, we find such phonological representations as
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/cel+ou+a+e+t/ for the third person singular, where lax /e/ is the theme vowel, and /t/
the marker for the third person. The first rule of interest to apply to this form con-
verts a tense vowel into /j/ when followed by a lax vowel. (Lightner labels this rule
V:j.) Application of this rule gives us the representation /cel+ou+j+e+t/. Notice that
the u - w rule cannot apply at this stage. There is a further rule that converts
dipthongs into monophthongs, by deleting the first member and tensing the second. Thus,
in this particular case, we have /ou/ going to tense /u/ and we derive /cel+u+j+'+t/
as desired.
It is not feasible in this report to give a thorough, critical evaluation of Lightner's
analysis, but my own study 2 suggests that his proposals depend upon a rather dubious
syntactic analysis of the Russian verb, and that the rules involved in the alternation do
not have the independent motivation which Lightner alleges.
An extremely interesting suggestion was made recently by Morris Halle3 as an alter-
native to Lightner's proposed solution of the problem. Halle proposes to account for the
alternation partly through an extension of the well-known rule which tenses yers before
/j/ followed by a morpheme beginning with a consonant. (As an alternative, LightnerI
proposed a laxing rule (u:Q) which operates in the environment j + V.) Take, for
example, verbs like kryt, 'to cover', pit, 'to drink', and vit, 'to sew'. The present
tense forms (e.g., 1 sg. kroju, p'ju, s'ju) indicate that the proper underlying represen-
tations for the stems of these verbs are /kr'j-/, /p'lj-/, and /ilj-/, respectively. When
these stems are followed by a consonant, as in the infinitive, the stem vowels are tensed.
Halle sets up /uj/ and /ij/ as the diphthongs underlying the ov~u alternation, deriving
4
/w/ from /j/ by an interesting rule that is discussed by Flier.
Consider the form torguet from underlying /trg+uj+5F4+t/ according to Halle's
analysis. Lightner's rule (V:j) gives /torg+jj+j+e+t/. Now, the question arises, How
does tensing apply to this form? Observing that /u/ is tensed to unrounded /y/ when
/j/ is followed by a [+consonantal] segment and that /j/ is [-consonantal], Halle for-
mulates the following tensing rule:
(2) V - +tense / ## X j + -syll Y##
around] cons
By this rule, we derive /trg+{j+j+e+t/, as required. For those cases when the input to
rule (2) is the front yer // (e. g., klevat,/kljuet), we need an additional rule to apply
after rule (2):
(3) +syll - [+back]
We illustrate the use of rule (3) in the following derivation.
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(4) /klYj +a+e +t/
kl, ij+j +e +tkl, Yij+j++t
kl, uj+j + +t
[kl, uj ot]
underlying form of kljuet
V:j
palatalization before front Vs and /j/
rule (2) (tensing)
rule (3)
other rules
In the infinitive forms, the yers are
by Flier's glide-conversion rule.
(5) /trg+uj+a+t,/
torg+oj +a+t,
torg+ow+a+t,
/klYj +a+t, /
klej+ +t,
kl'w+a+t,
subject to a lowering rule and /j/ becomes /w/
yer lowering
j- w
Other rules (e. g. , palatalization and w - v) give the correct phonetic representations.
Unfortunately, this highly interesting proposal will not work because of aspectual
pairs such as klevat, /kljunut, and plevat, /pljunut, 'to spit'. For the perfective forms,
rule (2) gives incorrect results, predicting */klTj+nu+t,/ and */plTj+nu+t,/ from under-
lying /klj+nu+t,/ and /pllj+nu+t,/, since /n/, of course, is [+consonantal]. I shall
not discuss ad hoc measures to patch up rule (2) but will outline an alternative in the
spirit of Halle's solution. It seems to me that what is most attractive about his proposal
is the idea that the ov~u alternation is part of the phenomenon of yer-tensing. I sug-
gest that underlying the alternation are the diphthongs /uw/ and /Tw/. Furthermore,
I propose that rule (2) be replaced by the following transformational rule:
(6) + s yll -syll
-cons -cons
+high +high >
-tense around
pback
1
+tense
around
pback j
[-syll]
Essentially, what rule (6) says is that before a nonsyllabic segment a yer plus glide
cluster becomes a tense monophthong whose specifications for the features [back] and
[round] depend upon those of the underlying glide. Thus, /uw/ and /Tw/ go to /u/, and
/j/ and /Tj/ go to /1/. To derive the correct phonetic forms, we require that
rule (6) apply after palatalization. We also require the application of a familiar rule
which changes /7/ to /7/ following a hard consonant, as in the following deriva-
tions.
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(7) /kr j+t,/ /plj+t,/ /klYw+nu+t,/ /tr g+w+ae +t/
torg+Uw+j +' +t V: j
p, j+t, kl, Tw+nu+t, palatalization
kri+t, p, T+t, kl, u+nu+t, torg+u+j ++t rule (6)
kry+t, i- y
All attempts to handle the ov-u alternation have been plagued by the problem of
deriving the deverbal noun torgovlja 'trading' 1, 2 If the ov suffix in this noun is the
same as that of the verb, then we should expect rule (6) to apply, giving :torguja from
the natural underlying representation /trg+'w+j+a/. There are at least two possible
solutions: We can bracket the underlying representation of torgovlja as ((torg+Ujw)+j+a),
making yer lowering a cyclic rule, so that on the second cycle we get (torg+ow+j+a),
to which rule (6) cannot apply. Alternatively, we may claim that the suffix in the
deverbal noun is not the same as that of the verb, but rather a suffix with the same pho-
netic shape but a less abstract underlying form /+6w+/ which is found in many adjec-
tives (e. g., torgovyj, stolovaja, metrovyj, tigrovyj, etc.) and nouns (e.g., torgovka,
oblicovka, metrovka, traktovka, etc.).
The second alternative seems to be much more reasonable. In the first place there
is no independent motivation for the proposed bracketing of torgovlja. Second, with one
exception, we never find traces of the ov~u alternation outside the verb paradigms.
There is one noun form (and, to my knowledge, only one) for which we seem to
have reason to posit the /+Uw+/ suffix. This is poceluj 'kiss'. We give this word the
underlying representation /p =cel+uw+j+u/, with /+j+/ as the same noun-forming suf-
fix of other masculine nouns (e. g. , rubl, from /rub+j+uu/, and vozd, from /vod+j+u/),
and /+u/ as the marker for the nominative masculine singular. Rule (6) applies in the
expected fashion. Thus, aside from this one noun, we conclude that instances of the
suffix ov outside the verb paradigms are derived from underlying /+'w+/ rather than
/+u'w+/.
R. A. Faraci
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C. LEXICAL AND INFERRED MEANINGS FOR SOME
TIME ADVERBS
One major result of recent semantic investigations is that the interpretation of a
sentence cannot be completely specified in either deep or surface structure simply by
combining the lexical readings of its constituents. The combinatorial reading for a
sentence is often subject to processes, some formal and some dependent on knowledge
of the world, which extend, restrict, or totally change the meaning. In this report we
shall attempt to specify some of these processes as they apply to sentences containing
certain time adverbials, such as until, before, during and throughout.
Under most circumstances the sentences (la) and (2a) are interpreted as synonymous,
but the differential acceptability of (ib) and (2b) shows that the basic meanings of the
(a) sentences cannot be identical.
(1) a. Before the arrival of the rebel army, the government forces controlled the town.
b. During one period before the arrival of the rebel army, the government forces
controlled the town.
(2) a. Until the arrival of the rebel army, the government forces controlled the town.
b. *During one period until the arrival of the rebel army the government forces
controlled the town. 1
The contrast between (ib) and (2b) suggests that until has the lexical reading (3), while
before has the lexical reading (4), and sentence (2b) is ungrammatical because the
meaning of until contradicts the meaning of during one period.
(3) until = at all times prior to NP
(4) before = at some time(s) prior to NP
(where NP is the object of the adverb phrase).
If these readings are roughly correct, then we have a simple explanation for the fact
that until is only grammatical in sentences with non point-action interpretations. Sen-
tence (5a) would be unacceptable because the meaning of until contradicts the meaning
of die, a point-action verb which in this context cannot be interpreted as repetitive. This
contradiction stands out if we construct the reading for the sentence, as in (5b).
(5) a. *John died until dawn.
b. John died at all times prior to dawn.
As (6b) shows, the corresponding sentence with before contains no contradiction in the
reading. This explains why before is not restricted to non point-action environ-
ments.
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(6) a. John died before dawn.
b. John died at some time prior to dawn.
We have shown that before and until must be given distinct lexical readings, but the
problem of explaining the apparent synonymy of (la) and (2a) remains. Both sentences
appear to mean that the government forces controlled the town right up to the arrival
of the rebel army, but only the sentence with until has this interpretation by virtue of
the lexical readings of its parts. The before sentence is interpreted as synonymous with
the until sentence by virtue of an inference or implicature. The way in which such an
inference can be distinguished from the basic meaning of a sentence is that it can be
canceled in the appropriate context. Thus (7) is anomalous because the second sentence
contradicts the lexical reading of the first; but (8) is acceptable because here the second
sentence merely cancels an inference normally made from the first.
(7) 'Until he died John was sick with pneumonia, but he was cured of it, and died of
something else.
(8) Before he died, John was sick with pneumonia, but he was cured of it, and died of
something else.
The rule of implicature which accounts for the apparent synonymy of some before and
until sentences might be stated as follows:
(9) If a sentence containing an adverb with an existential quantifier in its lexical repre-
sentation asserts that a durative action or state occurs in a specific time period,
then the action or state is presumed to have occurred throughout the period, context
permitting. In other words, context permitting, existential quantifiers in time
adverbs are reinterpreted as universal quantifiers.2
In addition to before, rule (9) applies to the adverb during. This accounts for the
synonymy of sentences like (10) and (11).
(10) The government forces occupied the town during the battle.
(11) The government forces occupied the town throughout the battle.
The differential acceptability of (12) and (13) demonstrates that throughout, like until,
contains a universal quantifier in its lexical representation while during, like before,
contains an existential quantifier.
(12) '-John died throughout the night.
(13) John died during the night.
There is another rule of inference, similar to (9), which operates on sentences with
before (and during), but this inference also operates on until (and throughout). Sen-
tences (la) and (2a), for example, seem to mean not only that the government forces
controlled the town right up to the arrival of the rebel army, but also (14).
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(14) When the rebel army arrived, the government forces lost control of the town.
In both (la) and (2a), however, this meaning is not basic but only implicated. The impli-
cature of (14) can be explicitly canceled, as in (15).
(15) Beforej the arrival of the rebel army, the government forces controlled the
town. Then when they arrived the rebels decided not to attack so the government
was able to hold on.
Similarly, (10) and (11) suggest (16) but that suggestion can be canceled, as in (17):
(16) The government forces stopped occupying the town at the end of the battle.
(17) The government forces occupied the town dthuring ut the battle and kept on
occupying it for two weeks afterward.
The rule of implicature which gives (14) and (16) might be stated as (18):
(18) If a durative action or state occurs in a specified time period, then, context per-
mitting, the action or state is presumed to end at the end of the period.
One immediate result of Principle (18) is that it allows us to explain the semantic
interpretation of sentences like (19) which contain the not until construction.
(19) Not until noon did John wake up.
Sentence (19) appears on first reading to be synonymous with (20), but the differential
acceptability of (21) and (22) shows that although (19) suggests (20) it does not entail (20)
and so cannot be synonymous with it.
(20) John woke up at noon.
(21) *John woke up at noon. In fact, he only woke up at 3 P. M.
(22) Not until noon did John wake up. In fact he only woke up at 3 P. M.
What (19) does entail (and perhaps presupposes) is (23), a fact shown by the self-
contradictoriness and consequent unacceptability of (24).
(23) John woke up.
(24) ':Not until noon did John wake up. In fact, he didn't wake up at all.
In addition to what it implicates and entails, (19), of course, asserts (25).
(25) John didn't wake up at any time before noon.
In fact, except for the entailment of (23), (19) is synonymous with (26). Sentence (27)
shows that (26) does not entail (23), since that entailment would make (27) self-
contradictory, which it is not.
(26) Until noon John didn't wake up.
QPR No. 104 262
(XX. LINGUISTICS)
(27) Until noon John didn't wake up. In fact, he didn't wake up at all.3
Principle (18) gives a direct explanation for why both (19) and (26) seem to mean (20).
According to (18), the state of John's not waking up is presumed to end at noon, as in
(20). The presumption seems somewhat stronger in (19) than in (26), but this is so
because part of the presumption given by (18) is already an entailment of (19) (namely,
that John did wake up) so that the speaker of (19) is committed by logic to a stronger
statement than is the speaker of (26).
One question which is immediately raised by the postulation of principles like (9) and
(18) is their status in the theory of grammar. At this point there seem to be two ways
of treating the rules, either as instances of the operation of Grice's conversational
maxims 4 or as independent semantic principles that cannot be derived simply from the
assumption that the speaker of a sentence is trying to communicate efficiently.
In Grice's view, the participants in a conversation ordinarily assume that they are
engaged in a cooperative enterprise with an accepted purpose and direction. Therefore
they behave and expect their partner(s) to behave according to the following cooperative
principle:
(28) Make your contribution to the conversation such as to advance its accepted purpose
or direction.
From this principle Grice derives four categories of conversational maxims, those of
quantity, quality, relation and manner. The maxims can be summarized as follows:
(29) Quantity
a. Don't give too little information.
b. Don't give too much information.
(30) Quality-Try to speak the truth.
a. Don't lie.
b. Don't make statements for which you have insufficient evidence.
(31) Relation-Be relevant.
(32) Manner-Be easy to understand.
a. Avoid obscurity and ambiguity.
b. Be brief and orderly.
It would be a simple matter to make principle (18) follow from maxim (29a). Sentences
like (la), (2a), (10), and (11) say that an action occurred in the period covered by the
time adverbial but not what happened otherwise. Under the assumptions that the speaker
ordinarily will know if and when the action stopped and also that this information will
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usually be relevant to the conversation, it follows that the sentences violate (29a). If
we interpret the sentences according to (18), the violation is eliminated. A consequence
of the use of the maxims, however, is that they require that interpretations according
to (18) not exist in certain contexts. If a speaker uses sentences like (la), (Za), (10),
and (11) when he does not know when the action ended but only that it overlapped the
period specified in the adverb phrases, then the addition of an interpretation according
to (18) violates (30b) by committing the speaker to saying more than he has evidence
for.
It follows that sentences with time adverb phrases ought to be interpreted according
to (18) if the speaker can be presumed to know the temporal bounds of the action he is
describing but not in the absence of such a presumption. Thus, the sentences of (33)
all suggest that the action was coterminous with the time period marked by the adverb
phrase.
(33) a. John slept throug the movie.
b. The baby cried while the record player was on.
c. Tom was a rebel from the time he was thirteen.
d. John sang well before his recent illness.
The sentences of (34), on the other hand, should not carry interpretations according to
(18) because the contents of these sentences suggest that the speaker has no knowledge
of the limits of the action or state described.
(34) a. Throughou the time I was watching the game, John played well.
b. The child cried constantly while I was observing it.
c. John was a good musician from the time I started listening to him.
d. John played quietly ibefore I left the house.
As Grice's maxims would predict, sentences (34a) and (34b) do not carry the suggestion
that the action in the sentences ended at the end of the time period given by the adverb
phrases. With sentences (34c) and (34d), however, the case is different. These sen-
tences, contrary to what would follow from Grice' s maxims, do suggest that the action
is coterminous with the end of the time period marked by the adverb phrase. This
behavior of (34c) and (34d) is evidence that a rule which is more than an instance of
Griceian conversational implicature is needed to account for inferences associated with
at least some time adverbs. In its application to adverbs like before, until, and from,
(18) seems to be independent of the conversational context and to be a substantive
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semantic process in its own right. A first approximation to accounting for the differ-
ences among the sentences of (34) would be to say that the postulation of rule (18) as an
independent semantic process is necessary for time adverbs with the following semantic
feature in common: Their object noun phrases constitute a boundary point of the time
period that they describe. For time adverbs whose objects are time periods as wholes
rather than boundary points, a Griceian treatment seems adequate. Unfortunately, the
underlying reason for this difference remains obscure.
If the use of Grice's maxims to account for (18) is problematic, using them to
account for (9) is more so. As Grice points out, expressions with the same basic
meaning must have the same conversational implicatures, since the conversational
maxims refer to general properties of communication and not to peculiarities of par-
ticular words or expressions. In this instance all time expressions containing the
existential quantifier should be subject to (9). As the sentences of (35) show, however,
time expressions with the explicit existential quantifier some are not normally inter-
preted with some read as all.
(35) a. The government forces occupied the town during some of the battle.
b. At some times before the arrival of the rebel army, the government forces
controlled the town.
If (9) were an instance of conversational implicature, then the sentences with explicit
existential quantifiers would be subject to it just as are sentences with the existential
quantifiers hidden in the time adverbs. The obvious inapplicability of (9) to (35a) and
(35b) demonstrates, therefore, that (9) is not attributable to conversational implica-
ture.
In addition to these objections to using the notion of conversational implicature to
account for the specific principles (9) and (18), there is a more general argument against
the possibility of using that notion to explain any similar semantic process. The
argument is that Grice' s maxims are so general and vague that inferences that are not
actually made in speech can be derived from sentences by conversational implicature
just as readily as inferences that are made. This being the case, Grice's maxims have
no explanatory force, whatever their heuristic value. One clear example of such false
conversational implicature goes as follows.
A sentence like "John ate the apple" is taken to mean "John ate at least some of the
apple," by conversational implicature. If the speaker had meant that the whole apple was
eaten, then he would have said, "John ate all of the apple" in order not to violate the
maxim of Quantity (29a) by giving too little information. Since he left out the word "all",
he must have been obeying the maxim of Quality (3 0b) and avoided saying more than he
knew. Therefore, all that the speaker was saying is that at least part of the apple was
eaten.
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Of course, the inference normally made from "John ate the apple," is in actual fact
the one ruled out above, namely that John ate the whole apple; and this inference can
also be derived from the maxims. The reasoning starts by saying that the speaker
would have said "John ate at least some of the apple" if that were all he knew (by 30b).
Since he left out the qualifying phrase, he must have meant to convey that the whole apple
was eaten. Otherwise he would have been giving too little information. Obviously, a theory
that accounts for what exists and for what does not exist with equal ease can provide
no explanations. 5
Perhaps a more promising way of integrating Principles (9) and (18) into semantic
theory is Geis and Zwicky's notion of "invited inference."6 They point out that if-then
sentences like (36a) tend to be interpreted as if they were biconditionals like (36b).
(36) a. If John comes, I will cheer.
b. If John comes, I will cheer and if John doesn't come, I won't cheer.
In other words, ordinary language conditionals invite the inference of their converses.
Principle (18) can be seen as a special case of this sort of invited inference. Sentences
containing time adverbs can be stated as conditionals and forming the converses of these
conditionals gives the same result as applying (18). Thus the converse of (37a) is (38a)
and the result of applying (18) to (37b) is (38b). Clearly, the sum of (37a) + (38a) is
synonymous with (37b) + (38b).
(37) a. If t was before noon, then John was asleep at t.
b. John slept until noon.
(38) a. If t wasn't before noon, then John wasn't asleep at t.
b. John stopped sleeping at noon.
Geis and Zwicky believe that there are other principles of invited inference besides
"conditionals become biconditionals," two of which they mention in their paper. The
fact that (18) is a special case of one principle of invited inference suggests that the
principle (9) should also be seen as a principle of invited inference. We look for still
more such principles.
A. S. Kroch
Footnotes and References
1. This sentence would be grammatical with commas around the until phrase, but then
the sentence would have a different structure. The until phrase would be an appos-
itive phrase and not part of the object of during. With this structure the sentence is
no longer unacceptable because it is no longer self-contradictory.
2. This principle applies at least to the following time adverbs: before, during, between,
while and after. The semantics of time adverbials is dealt with from an entirely
different point of view by M. Geis in "Time Prepositions as Underlying Verbs,"
Papers of the Chicago Linguistics Society, Vol. 6, pp. 235-249. His treatment,
however, does not deal with any of the issues we are concerned with here.
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3. Sentence (27) may sound somewhat strained because principle (18) applies very
strongly to sentences with until. That (18) is only an implicature and not an entail-
ment, however, is shown by the perfect acceptability of sentence (ii) below:
(i) Until now John hasn't agreed. I am glad that he changed his mind.
(ii) Until now John hasn't agreed. I don't think he will ever change his mind.
4. H. P. Grice, "Logic and Conversation," William James Lectures, Harvard Univer-
sity (unpublished).
6
5. In their Squib "On Invited Inferences," Geis and Zwicky say that Grice's maxim of
relevance 3 cannot generate explanations of their inferences. However, the
maxims of Quantity and Quality account for the inferences without difficulty. It is
hard to imagine what plausible inference could not be justified by these maxims. See
also L. Karttunen, "Counterfactual Conditionals," Ling. Inquiry, Vol. II, No. 4,
pp. 566-569, Fall 1971.
6. M. Geis and A. Zwicky, "On Invited Inferences," Ling. Inquiry, Vol. II, No. 4,
pp. 561-566, Fall 1971.
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